Seven years of ambitious promises on climate, the economy, security and a stronger Europe. But what has the ordinary European citizen actually gained in return? And perhaps more importantly, what has it cost? A critical assessment of a presidency in which European ambitions have grown, while questions about integrity, affordability and democratic accountability have become increasingly prominent.
Written by Keimp Pijpstra
Seven years of European Leadership
On 1 December 2019, Ursula von der Leyen took office as President of the European Commission. She became the first woman to hold this position. Her ambitions were considerable: Europe was to become greener, more digital, economically stronger and more independent.
Almost seven years have now passed. The COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the energy crisis and growing international tensions have profoundly shaped her presidency. In July 2024, she was re-elected for a second term, which runs until 2029. But re-election is not proof of successful leadership. The real question is what European citizens have actually experienced as a result of her leadership.
Has life become more affordable? Has the European economy become stronger? Is Europe safer? And perhaps most importantly, has public confidence in European institutions increased?
A fair assessment requires more than a list of political ambitions and achievements. The bill must also be put on the table.
Integrity: The controversy surrounding the Pfizer Text Messages
Anyone exercising such considerable political power must be prepared to provide full accountability. That is precisely why the controversy surrounding the so-called Pfizer text messages is so important.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the European Commission negotiated the purchase of large quantities of COVID-19 vaccines. Von der Leyen was in direct contact with Albert Bourla, Pfizer’s CEO. Text messages were exchanged between them. These negotiations involved enormous sums of money and had major implications for society.
When journalists from The New York Times requested access to the messages, the European Commission refused to disclose them. The Commission stated that it did not possess the messages.
On 14 May 2025, the General Court of the European Union delivered its judgment in Case T-36/23. The Court annulled the Commission’s decision. The institution had failed to provide an adequate explanation of the searches it had conducted and why the messages were unavailable. Nor had it sufficiently clarified what might have happened to the messages.
The Court did not establish that von der Leyen had personally engaged in corrupt conduct or financially benefited herself. To suggest otherwise would be an incorrect conclusion. However, the judgment does expose a serious problem: the European Commission failed to provide adequate accountability regarding communications surrounding a contract of enormous financial magnitude.
This is not merely a question of whether certain messages should be made public. It also concerns a more fundamental principle: important communications relating to public administration must be capable of being scrutinised after the fact.
A leader who demands transparency from others must set the same example. Integrity is not simply about complying with the law; it is also about being willing to provide openness regarding one’s own actions.
The controversy has done little to strengthen public confidence in European governance.
The Green Deal: A noble objective with a high price tag
One of von der Leyen’s flagship projects is the European Green Deal. Europe aims to become climate-neutral by 2050. By 2030, greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced by at least 55 per cent compared with 1990 levels.
There is no serious dispute that climate change is a major problem. The transition towards sustainability and reducing dependence on fossil fuels are also sensible objectives. But good intentions do not automatically guarantee good policy. Implementation has significant economic and social consequences.
Households are expected to invest in insulation and new heating systems. Motorists are encouraged to switch to electric vehicles. Businesses face new environmental regulations and investment requirements. Farmers are confronted with changing European agricultural and environmental rules.
Not everyone can afford these costs. People with sufficient savings can invest and benefit from subsidies. Households with limited financial resources have far fewer opportunities to do so. So what do the results look like?
The Joint Research Centre, the European Commission’s scientific research service, examined 154 specific Green Deal objectives. The findings, published in February 2025, were mixed:
| Progress | Number of objectives |
|---|---|
| On track | 32 |
| Acceleration needed | 64 |
| Insufficient progress or regression | 15 |
| Insufficient data available | 43 |
| Total | 154 |
The figures demonstrate that political ambitions do not automatically translate into results. For a substantial proportion of the objectives, progress needs to accelerate, or there is insufficient information to assess how much progress has actually been made.
International competition adds another challenge. European businesses must compete with companies from China and the United States, where energy prices and regulatory requirements can be very different.
In its November 2025 report on the State of the Energy Union, the European Commission itself acknowledged that energy prices for European businesses remain higher than those faced by major international competitors. Climate policies that weaken European industry could ultimately cost jobs, investment and purchasing power.
The question, therefore, is not whether Europe should become more sustainable, but whether the chosen path is economically viable and socially fair. A sustainable future must not become something that only people with high incomes can afford.
COVID-19: European solidarity with a bill for future generations
During the COVID-19 pandemic, von der Leyen opted for a joint European approach to vaccine procurement. In addition, the NextGenerationEU recovery programme was established. Its total value amounted to €806.9 billion in current prices. The funds were intended to support economic recovery, digitalisation, sustainability and the strengthening of EU member states.
The joint approach had its advantages. European countries could negotiate collectively and prevent the wealthiest nations from buying up all the available vaccines for themselves. But it also marked a historic financial step: the European Union began borrowing collectively on a large scale.
An important distinction needs to be made here. Part of the recovery programme consists of loans that must be repaid by the member states receiving them. In addition, there are grants whose financing will ultimately have to be repaid from EU resources. The financial consequences do not disappear when the recovery programme comes to an end.
Repayment of the joint European financing, together with the associated interest costs, will place a burden on future European budgets. This means that future generations will also face the financial consequences.
The question is whether these investments will generate sufficient economic returns to justify this arrangement.
How many projects will deliver lasting economic growth? How many investments will genuinely strengthen the European economy? And how much money will be absorbed by bureaucracy or projects with limited benefits for society?
European solidarity can be valuable, but it must not become a licence for inadequate financial oversight. Those who take on debt collectively must also accept collective responsibility for how that money is spent and repaid.
Ukraine, Defence and Europe’s growing ambitions
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 fundamentally changed Europe’s security agenda.
Von der Leyen chose to support Ukraine, impose sanctions on Russia and increase European investment in defence. There are sound arguments for this approach. European security cannot be taken for granted, and the war has demonstrated how vulnerable energy supplies can be.
Progress has also been made in the energy sector. According to the European Commission, the share of Russian gas in European gas imports fell from approximately 45 per cent in 2021 to 12 per cent in 2025.
This represents a significant change, but part of Europe’s dependence on Russian gas has simply been replaced by dependence on other suppliers. Moreover, European energy prices have remained a problem for businesses and households.
In its November 2025 report on the State of the Energy Union, the Commission acknowledged that energy prices remained higher than those faced by major international competitors.
The question, therefore, is whether Europe has genuinely become more independent, or whether part of its dependence has simply shifted to other suppliers.
At the same time, Europe wants to invest substantially more in defence and security. This will cost billions. Every euro spent on defence is a euro that cannot simultaneously be spent on healthcare, education or social services. That does not mean defence spending is wrong. Security inevitably comes at a price. But citizens have the right to understand the objectives, costs and results.
Spending more on defence is not, in itself, a guarantee of a safer Europe. What matters just as much is what those investments actually deliver.
What does the Dutch citizen pay?
The financial consequences become more tangible when we look at the Netherlands.
According to the Netherlands Court of Audit, the Netherlands contributed approximately €7.5 billion to the European Union in 2024. In return, it received approximately €3.15 billion in EU funding.
The Netherlands is therefore a net contributor.
This does not necessarily mean that EU membership represents an economic loss. The European Single Market is extremely important to the Netherlands as a trading nation. The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) has calculated that the additional trade generated by the Single Market structurally increases Dutch gross domestic product by approximately 3.1 per cent. A fair assessment must therefore take both financial contributions and economic benefits into account.
But Europe’s financial ambitions continue to grow.
In July 2025, the Commission presented its proposal for the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework. The proposal amounts to approximately €1,763 billion in 2025 prices. Of this amount, around €149 billion is earmarked for repayment of the joint COVID-19 debt.
The proposal includes investments in defence, competitiveness, climate policy, agriculture and security. At the time of writing, it is still subject to negotiations and is therefore not an already approved or fully allocated budget.
Nevertheless, it demonstrates the scale of Europe’s financial ambitions.
Citizens are entitled to ask whether Brussels is trying to do too much at once: more defence, more climate policies, more subsidies, more joint financing and more European powers.
Ultimately, all this money has to come from somewhere. And although European investments can generate benefits, financial accountability must not disappear behind complicated budgetary arrangements and political promises.
The growing distance between Brussels and ordinary citizens
In Brussels, the language revolves around strategic autonomy, climate neutrality, geopolitical influence and digital transformation.
But ordinary citizens are concerned about other things:
- Can I afford my energy bills?
- Can I find an affordable home?
- Will I have enough money left after buying groceries?
- Can my business remain competitive?
- Will my job still be secure ten years from now?
These are not minor concerns. They are at the very heart of political governance. European regulations can be useful, for example when it comes to consumer protection and product safety. But increasingly complex obligations also create costs, particularly for smaller businesses.
The European Commission itself now acknowledges that reducing administrative burdens and simplifying regulations are necessary to keep the European economy competitive.
This raises an uncomfortable question: how much regulation is genuinely necessary, and how much has regulation itself become an objective?
A strong European Union does not automatically have to be a union with ever more rules and powers. Sometimes good governance means getting rid of unnecessary regulations.
European citizens gain little from ambitious policy programmes if their everyday consequences are not given sufficient consideration.
The Final Assessment: A stronger Brussels, but a better society?
After almost seven years under von der Leyen’s leadership, the picture is mixed. There have been achievements. Europe acted collectively during the COVID-19 pandemic, reduced its dependence on Russian gas and took important steps in digital regulation and international cooperation.
But there have also been serious shortcomings.
The controversy surrounding the Pfizer messages has raised questions about transparency and governmental accountability. The Green Deal has ambitious objectives, but implementation remains behind schedule in many areas. The joint COVID-19 debt will have to be repaid, while European budgetary ambitions continue to grow. Europe’s competitiveness and the affordability of energy also remain major challenges.
Perhaps the greatest problem is the growing distance between political ambitions in Brussels and the everyday reality of ordinary citizens. A larger European Union is not automatically a better European Union. More regulation does not automatically mean more progress. And billions in investment do not automatically translate into billions in benefits for society.
Von der Leyen has given Europe a clear political direction. But whether that direction is the right one should not be decided by the European Commission itself.
That judgement belongs to European citizens.
Europe must deliver affordable energy, a strong economy, sufficient housing, good public services, security and responsible use of taxpayers’ money.
Anyone governing on behalf of hundreds of millions of Europeans must do more than present ambitious plans. They must also be open about the results, the mistakes made and the bill that citizens ultimately have to pay.
The most important question for the coming years is therefore not how much more power Brussels can acquire, but how much public trust it can win back.
Because let us be clear about one thing. For us, and for those governing in Brussels: Europe (the EU) exists to serve its citizens. Not the other way around.
Sources and further reading
The following sources are from official European institutions or Dutch government organisations and can be consulted directly.
- European Commission – Ursula von der Leyen, President since 2019, with a second term running until 2029.
- European Parliament – Re-election of Ursula von der Leyen, 18 July 2024.
- General Court of the European Union – Judgment in Case T-36/23, Stevi and The New York Times v European Commission, 14 May 2025.
- Joint Research Centre – Delivering the European Green Deal: JRC study finds mixed progress so far, 5 February 2025.
- European Commission – NextGenerationEU and the European recovery programme.
- European Commission – State of the Energy Union Report 2025.
- Netherlands Court of Audit – Dutch contributions to and receipts from the EU in 2024.
- European Parliament – The policy priorities of the von der Leyen II Commission, 2026.
- Dutch Government – European Multiannual Financial Framework 2028–2034 and the Netherlands’ position.
- European Commission – Annual Management and Performance Report for the EU Budget 2024.